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Article
Types of knowledge in science-based practices
Nelius Boshoff
ABSTRACT: Science communication as an interdisciplinary field of study has al-
ways been concerned with issues of knowledge utilisation. This theoretical paper fo-
cusses on the “knowledge” part of knowledge utilisation and provides a conceptual
frame to distinguish between different types of knowledge in science-based practice.
A practitioner’s knowledge store is portrayed as a dense set of personal knowledge,
consisting of procedural knowledge, factual knowledge, potential factual knowledge
and opinions/beliefs; the totality of which is continuously refined through more ex-
periences and additional information received from people, documents or events.
Implications for future studies of knowledge utilisation in science-based practices
are highlighted and a number of questions posed to science communication as a
profession.
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Introduction
Historically, there has been a close association between “science communication” and
“knowledge utilisation” as academic fields. An example is the history of the journal Sci-
ence Communication. The journal originally began in 1979 as Knowledge: Creation,
Dissemination, Utilization, before changing to its current title (Science Communication)
in 1995. However, more recently the historical link between the fields of science com-
munication and knowledge utilisation has become quite tenuous. This is evident from the
small number of articles on the topic published since 2000 in both Science Communica-
tion [1–7] and JCOM [8–10] (although the latter journal only started in 2002).
The notion of “knowledge utilisation” implies two interrelated concepts — “knowl-
edge” and “utilisation” — and both of these deserve to be the subject of scholarly inves-
tigation. So far, though, it seems as if the emphasis in science communication has been
more on studies of utilisation and pathways to utilisation, rather than on deepening the
understanding of what is meant by knowledge, the different types of knowledge in dif-
ferent contexts, and how these could either facilitate or prevent the communication and
uptake of scientific research findings. A notable exception is a paper by Jacobson [3] that
appeared in Science Communication in 2007. The subtext of Jacobson’s discussion is that
the knowledge part of knowledge utilisation has been neglected and that social epistemol-
ogy, or the theory of the social aspects and dynamics of knowledge, could be useful in
that regard. According to Jacobson:
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research in knowledge transfer and exchange has generally been more focused on
using theory to explain, plan, or research transfer and exchange processes than on
using it to understand knowledge and the relationships between knowledge and these
processes [3, p. 120].
It is against this backdrop — of a lack of theorization about the meaning and dynamics
of knowledge in studies of knowledge utilisation — that my paper is aiming to make
a contribution. The paper provides a theoretical framework for distinguishing between
various types of knowledge in practice, which could inform future studies on the social
dynamics of knowledge in the uptake of research findings in practice. The goal is to
stimulate enquiry into studies of different types of knowledge in different contexts of
practice as an area of research for academics who work at the intersection of science
communication and knowledge utilisation. The context in which I will be discussing the
different types is science-based practice, from the perspective of the “practitioners” who
operate in that context.
Practitioners of science-based practises include two categories of professionals: firstly,
those whose activities are informed by the outputs of science (e.g. doctors, nurses and
winemakers) and secondly, those whose task it is to produce science (e.g. molecular bi-
ologists). Explicit demands for evidence-based practice (EBP) are almost non-existent in
the case of the second category of professionals; most probably because it is assumed that
scientists would automatically update their scientific knowledge as part of doing research.
Peer review of scientific publications, for instance, could act as a mechanism to ensure
that those who produce science are also conversant with the latest global scientific de-
velopments as it is commonly expected of them to contextualise their research within the
global scientific literature. However, of all science-based practitioners the call for EBP
is most strongly felt in the case of health practitioners, who belong to the first category
of professionals. This is no surprise as the decisions taken by health practitioners often
deal with matters of life or death. Between these two extremes — of no explicit pressures
for EBP and, on the other hand, well-articulated and strongly felt pressures for EBP —
all other science-based practitioners are to be located (i.e. winemakers, veterinarians and
social workers, to mention a few others).
Practitioners in science-based practises therefore refer to a diverse group of profes-
sionals who share a number of characteristics. Firstly, all received their initial training
at some institution of higher learning, where they were exposed to the best of scientific
information available at the time. Secondly, in the execution of their respective profes-
sions it is expected of them, either explicitly or implicitly, to be continuously aware of
the latest scientific and research developments in their fields, and to make use of the vari-
ous tools and mechanisms that were specifically developed for that purpose (e.g. practice
guidelines, workshops, research synopses). Thirdly, not being conversant with the latest
scientific and research developments could have detrimental consequences — not only for
the practitioners and their immediate clientele/beneficiaries, but also for society at large.
Examples of negative consequences on a larger scale could include preventable mortality
and health systems that are cost-ineffective (for health practitioners), lack of industrial
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innovation and economic non-competitiveness (for winemakers in “new world” wine in-
dustries) and an inadequate human capital base (for university researchers responsible for
producing the next generation of scientists).
Although some may argue that discussions of the meaning of knowledge in different
contexts of practice — in this case science-based practice — are too far removed from the
field of science communication, others may argue that such a statement itself is estranged
from reality. In a recent contribution to JCOM, the current editor of Science Communica-
tion, Susanna Priest, underscores the need for scholars of science communication to move
beyond the conventional demarcations of the field by stating that:
we have learned over the years that science communication is not just a translation
problem — not, in other words, a simple matter of using familiar words to convey
complex subject matter, nor even a matter of communicating a particular set of facts
or ideas more accurately. Rather, it is something more subtle that invokes questions
about a host of profound philosophical issues such as what is scientific truth, as well
as sociological ones such as whose truth most matters in society [11, p. 2].
In this paper I focus on the different “truths” of science-based practitioners, where
these are portrayed as different types of knowledge in practice. Science-based practition-
ers such as doctors or nurses do not accept new knowledge (whether scientific or not)
unconditionally, but first “make decisions about the value, usefulness, and appropriate-
ness of particular knowledge to their setting and circumstances” [12, p. 20]. A practi-
tioner’s existing knowledge thus acts as either a barrier or facilitator in the uptake of new
knowledge. Against this backdrop it seems worthwhile to unpack the key elements of
what I call a practitioner’s personal knowledge store, which includes both factual and
procedural knowledge.
The paper starts with a discussion of these different types of knowledge and moves
towards constructing a visual representation of a practitioner’s knowledge store. This is
followed by a brief discussion that links the concept of a practitioner’s knowledge store
with the notions of “mindlines” and “knowledge networks”, which were developed by
others. Insights from the different types of knowledge are also used to reflect on whether
science-based practitioners prioritize non-scientific knowledge over scientific knowledge.
In conclusion I briefly outline the implications of the theoretical framework for future
studies of knowledge utilisation being conducted as part of science communication as an
interdisciplinary field of study. I also pose a number of questions about science commu-
nication as a field of professional specialisation.
The different types of knowledge
The distinction between “know-that” and “know-how”, which was made by the philoso-
pher Gilbert Ryle [13, 14], highlights two types of knowledge in practice: knowing that
something is the case and knowing how to do things. Sahdra and Thagard [15], for in-
stance, who studied the practices of molecular biologists, concluded that the knowledge
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of these scientists not only consists of facts about cellular molecules or theories of the
workings of molecules, but also of ways of doing things practically in the laboratory. The
two knowledge types go by different names in the scientific literature. “Know-that” is
sometimes referred to as factual knowledge, propositional knowledge, theoretical knowl-
edge, explicit knowledge or declarative knowledge. Similarly, a number of terms are
used to refer to “know-how” or aspects thereof, including procedural knowledge, practi-
cal knowledge, implicit knowledge, experiential knowledge and tacit abilities and skills.
In this paper, the terms factual knowledge and procedural knowledge are used together
with “know-that” and “know-how”. The purpose is to unpack these terms with refer-
ence to the relevant literature and to combine the insights in a visual representation of a
practitioner’s knowledge store.
Unpacking factual knowledge
The conventional conception of factual knowledge is that it is justified, true belief. Fac-
tual knowledge is normally expressed as a proposition, or is able to be expressed as a
proposition, even if the knowledge is never vocalized but only passes through the head
as a statement [16]. Moreover, factual knowledge is “formal, explicit, derived from re-
search and scholarship and concerned with generalizability” [17, p. 83], meaning that
the propositions have been empirically derived through systematic observation and ex-
perimentation [18]. Scientific evidence, therefore, can justify a belief as a factual claim,
because the evidence is empirical, replicable, verifiable and public.
However, science is accumulative as new knowledge is constantly generated that sup-
ports, contests or even supersedes existing knowledge; scientific theories also shift within
larger paradigms. Scientific evidence thus represents the best of current evidence at a
particular point in time and does not provide absolute and unconditional justification. In
other words, the degree to which a person is justified in believing that something is the
case at time X, depends on how well developed and credible the scientific evidence base
for that belief is at time X. According to Haack [19, p. 81] “justification comes in degrees”
and scientific evidence can be interpreted as a relevant source of justification for a certain
belief on the basis of other background beliefs, which may or may not be true.
Scientific research generates factual claims but the attention of research obviously can-
not be devoted to each and every conceivable concern. One could therefore argue that cer-
tain claims may very well have a potential scientific base but the research to demonstrate
their “factuality” has not yet been conducted or, where the research does exist, has not
explicitly and deliberately been linked to that belief. Thus, some beliefs and opinions fall
in a grey zone, as the verdict concerning their factuality can only be determined through
systematic research and scholarship. In the absence of supporting scientific research ev-
idence, a belief maintains its pervasiveness and pseudo-factuality through colloquial evi-
dence. Colloquial evidence, according to the definition by the Canadian Health Services
Research Foundation, is “anything that establishes a fact or gives reason for believing in
something” [20, p. 3]. These include, among others, evidence about resources, expert and
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professional opinion, judgement, values, habits and traditions, as well as the particular
pragmatics and contingencies of the situation. For that reason the notion of “potential
factual knowledge” can be used to indicate beliefs and opinions where the claims have
not yet been verified through the scientific method.
To summarise, the common factor between factual knowledge, potential factual knowl-
edge and ordinary beliefs is that all involve claims that can easily be codified. However,
the three sets of claims differ in terms of the degree of their supporting scientific evi-
dence. Whereas factual knowledge has a known scientific backing, ordinary beliefs have
none. Potential factual knowledge sits somewhere in-between as a special category of
belief that may or may not be “upgraded” to factual knowledge once the relevant claim
has been subjected to the scientific method.
Unpacking procedural knowledge
Procedural knowledge refers to skills and abilities that are demonstrated in practice
through the performance of procedures, without the performer necessarily being able to
articulate what is being done. The emphasis is on “necessarily” because in some cases
a skilful performer may also be able to describe the procedure. Pears [16] mentioned
two examples of know-how from everyday life where the underlying factual content is
present and absent respectively:
[A] cook who knows how to produce a souffle´ will almost certainly be able to say
how it is done, and when he does, he will be showing that he knows such facts as this:
if the product is going to be a souffle´, the yolks and the whites must be separated [16,
p. 26].
I know how to ride a bicycle, but I cannot say how I balance because I have no
method. I may know that certain movements, and even that certain muscles are
involved, but that factual knowledge comes later, if at all, and it could hardly be used
in instruction, like the factual knowledge of the cook [16, p. 26].
Procedural knowledge does not always remain implicit and without conscious aware-
ness. Thagard [21] illustrates this point with reference to three hypothetical cases about
the know-how involved in scientific collaboration. The first is where the know-how is
explicit from the start and a verbal rule has already been articulated. An example is an
experienced scientific collaborator telling a novice that, according to best practice, one
should select only collaborators with complementary strengths, and the novice then acts
on this advice and eventually sees it as the main explanation for his/her own know-how of
collaboration. In the second case, there is no verbal rule in place but a rule can potentially
be extracted from the procedural knowledge exhibited. An example is an experienced
collaborator who displays a certain kind of behaviour, such as how to run a laboratory
group meeting, which is then “picked up” by the novice who stores a memory of this
behaviour and eventually also duplicates it. The novice, if really pressed, could make
the relevant know-how explicit by formulating one or more verbal rules for it. Lastly,
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there are instances where procedural knowledge is inherently implicit and impossible to
translate into verbal rules, for instance in the case of a novice who does not have:
any conscious awareness or memory of the physical, intellectual, or social behaviours
of the experienced collaborator but nevertheless encodes and eventually duplicates
them [21, p. 187].
The latter quote is also an example of tacit knowledge, i.e. knowledge implicitly ac-
quired from everyday practice and which is very difficult, if not impossible, for the bearer
to articulate (Sternberg et al., cited in [22]). According to Polanyi [23], tacit knowledge
involves a functional relation between two “terms”: a proximal term and a distal term.
In tacit knowing, one attends from the proximal to the distal, but it is the proximal term
of which one possesses tacit knowledge. To use Polanyi’s example, by tacitly knowing
a face, one attends from the facial features (proximal) to the face (distal) without neces-
sarily being able to specify the features responsible for the immediate recognition. Tacit
knowing therefore involves the integration of the particulars (proximal) to achieve the co-
herent entity (distal) to which one is attending. However, the process of integration goes
beyond the mere observation of the particulars. The joint meaning of the particulars is
only achieved by fully incorporating the particulars within oneself.
Moreover, decisions and actions flowing from procedural knowledge often appear to
lack analytical reasoning. They happen quickly and effortlessly, with the same automatic-
ity that is typical of habitual behaviour [24], and tend to be largely intuitive. Carper [25]
was one of the first to identify intuition as an important source of knowing in nursing.
Also in nursing, McCormack [26] performed a concept analysis of the notion and pre-
sented four defining attributes of intuition: (i) immediate, unjustified true belief which
is not preceded by inference; (ii) non-propositional knowledge which is holistic in na-
ture; (iii) immediate knowledge of a concept that is independent of the linear reasoning
process; and (iv) a form of knowing that represents synthesis rather than analysis.
Intuition, being instinctive, at times manifests as gut feelings and “common sense”.
Stolper et al. [27] identified two common types of gut feelings among clinical practi-
tioners, namely a sense of alarm and a sense of reassurance. A sense of alarm involves a
number of elements: an uneasy feeling that something is wrong with a patient even though
the practitioner cannot find any indications objectively supporting that feeling, a distrust
of the situation because the prognosis appears to be uncertain, and a need for some kind of
intervention in order to avoid an adverse health problem. A sense of reassurance, on the
other hand, emerges as a secure feeling, specifically when the appropriate intervention is
clear in the mind of the practitioner even though a proper diagnosis could still be lacking.
Firmly embedded within the intuitive aspect of procedural knowledge is the notion of
“common sense”. A common sense view of matters, according to Geertz [28], means
that one attributes certain quasi-qualities to reality, such as naturalness, “practicalness”
and “thinness”. Common sense wisdom, in practice, therefore can result in one course of
action being intuitively selected above another, given that nothing needs to be queried or
reflected on, as the chosen action represents the way things are (naturalness), the chosen
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action is the obvious thing to do and anything else would be impractical (“practicalness”),
and the chosen action is precisely what it is, nothing more and nothing less (“thinness”).
Common sense and intuition arise from pattern recognition or the unconscious cogni-
tive matching of a particular pattern with similar patterns in a larger reservoir of patterns
that has been built up through experience [29]. Experience therefore strengthens the con-
fidence that practitioners have in their intuitions [30]. Intuitive knowledge also appears
to be more acute among experts as expertise requires the integration of factual and pro-
cedural knowledge:
The sense of “owning” a technique comes after the integration of procedural knowl-
edge of performing or doing it and propositional knowledge of the facts and theory
behind the technique; and both exploration and practice are necessary for the inte-
gration [15, p. 495].
A similar perspective on the development of expertise that also points to an integration
of factual and procedural knowledge is the stage model by Dreyfus and Dreyfus [31],
which Benner [32] subsequently applied to clinical nursing practice. According to this
model, expertise is developed through a process of skills acquisition, from the initial
conscious application of rule-guided know-that to the eventual automation of experience-
based know-how that has become fully internalised.
Unpacking personal knowledge
Although personal knowledge is discussed here as a separate concept, it is in fact a broader
category of knowledge that includes both factual and procedural knowledge. According to
Jones [33], knowledge can be personal in six senses, each is expressed in relation to “me”:
(i) owned by me; (ii) experienced by me; (iii) directed towards me; (iv) relevant to me; (v)
about me; or (vi) transmitted by me. Arguably, the first two meanings, ownership and ex-
perience, also provide the best description for personal knowledge — i.e. knowledge that
is owned by the practitioner as it is part of the internal knowledge store, and largely incor-
porates first-hand experience. In addition, a practitioner’s personal knowledge store also
incorporates any external information that was directed to the practitioner and of which
the practitioner has stored a memory, either consciously or subconsciously. This particu-
larly applies to information that was perceived as relevant at the time of encounter. The
practitioner may also extract parts of the store of personal knowledge to transmit to others.
Personal knowledge thus develops not only because of multiple experiences, involving
both failures and successes, but also because of encounters with different sources of exter-
nal information (e.g. early training materials, practice guidelines and fellow practitioners).
Any claim made by an external source can be of three types. Firstly, it can represent fac-
tual knowledge, which refers to instances where the scientific method was used to produce
the claim, resulting in a claim that is backed by the best of available scientific evidence.
Secondly, a claim can be labelled as opinion/belief if available scientific evidence does
not provide any support for that claim or contradicts it. Thirdly, between these two ex-
tremes (factual knowledge and opinion/belief) one finds the grey category of “potential
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factual knowledge”, referring to claims of uncertain nature. Such claims can be either
factually-based or opinion-based but a final decision is lacking for two reasons. Either the
claim has not yet been subjected to the scientific method, or relevant scientific research
has been conducted by other parties, mostly for unrelated reasons, but the findings are
sitting unobtrusively in the world’s vast pool of documented scientific research findings.
Deeply embedded within a practitioner’s store of personal knowledge is what is re-
ferred to as procedural knowledge. It is an intimate and automated expression of personal
knowledge, representing that part of personal knowledge which is internalised and ha-
bitually performed in practice. Intuition, common sense and gut feelings all point to the
presence of internalised procedural knowledge. However, although procedural knowledge
operates instinctively and subconsciously, not all procedural knowledge remains subcon-
scious. Some parts can be vocalized, and thus codified, if the practitioner is asked to
reflect upon the procedure concerned and formulate an explanation. That being said,
some parts of procedural knowledge — called tacit knowledge — will always elude cod-
ification. All of the above insights are captured in figure 1, which provides a visual rep-
resentation of a practitioner’s knowledge store.
Figure 1. Visual Representation of a Practitioner’s Knowledge Store.
Note: a knowledge store can be defined as a dense set of personal knowledge made up of procedu-
ral knowledge (parts of which are tacit), factual knowledge, potential factual knowledge and opin-
ions/beliefs; the totality of which is continuously refined and expanded through experience and exter-
nal information picked up from people, documents or events.
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In some instances, then, procedural knowledge cannot be made explicit and docu-
mented as it is inherently tacit. In other instances the implicitness of procedural knowl-
edge can also be made explicit, i.e. the underlying rules can be extracted through reflec-
tion, communication, etcetera, and presented as propositions [22, 34]. These propositions
can then be classified as factual knowledge, potential factual knowledge or mere opin-
ions/beliefs, depending on the degree of availability of scientific research findings to sup-
port the proposition. However, any attempt at codification is a matter of choice, and needs
to take into consideration both the benefit and cost involved in codification.
Linking a practitioner’s knowledge store with evidence-based practice (EBP),
“mindlines” and a “knowledge network”
The prioritization of propositions based on quality science — called factual knowledge in
this paper — is especially evident in the present push for EBP. Part of the EBP objective
is to strengthen the scientific base of practitioners’ decision-making and reduce their re-
liance on opinion-based decisions [35]. In health, for instance, EBP aims to achieve this
by facilitating the uptake of claims that are science-based and which have been “appraised
and found to be of sufficient rigour” [36, p. 270], specifically claims derived from “high
quality epidemiological studies, clinical intervention trials, and other robust research de-
signs on human subjects” (p. 397) (Sackett et al., cited in [37]). Promising instruments in
this regard are the so-called “third-generation” knowledge products [12], of which prac-
tice guidelines are key examples. The latter are user-friendly practice recommendations
derived from systematic reviews and meta-analyses of individual research studies. How-
ever, practice guidelines, as carriers of factual knowledge, are sometimes overlooked by
health practitioners in their daily routines. For instance, an ethnographic study of clini-
cians in two general practices in the U.K. [38] revealed a stronger reliance on knowledge
conveyed through networks with other practitioners and professionals, without the clin-
icians questioning whether or not the views of others were rooted in scientific research
(i.e. factual or not). The overwhelming tacit dimension of the clinicians’ knowledge base
compelled the investigators to introduce the notion of “mindlines”:
. . . clinicians relied on what we have called “mindlines”, collectively reinforced, in-
ternalised tacit guidelines, which were informed by brief reading, but mainly by their
interactions with each other and with opinion leaders, patients, and pharmaceutical
representatives and by other sources of largely tacit knowledge that built on their
early training and their own and their colleagues’ experience [38, p. 1014].
The point to be made is that the description of “mindlines” is reconcilable with the
representation of the knowledge store of practitioners (see the note to figure 1). The
conception of the knowledge store of practitioners also conforms well to the idea of a
“knowledge network” by Stolper et al. [39]. These authors portrayed the medical knowl-
edge of general practitioners as an associative network of inter-connective knowledge
parts that involve high-level concepts, contextual factors, patient information, symptoms,
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treatments, drugs, etc. The richer and denser the network becomes in terms of experience,
the more automated and non-analytical the process of clinical reasoning also becomes,
thereby sparking regular instances of gut feeling and intuitive knowing:
With increasing experience, their [general practitioners — GPs] knowledge network
will become richer and more coherent, and non-analytical reasoning will more often
be invoked, but experienced GPs are able to switch to analytical reasoning when
the automatic approach is not enough to explain the patient’s situation (pp. 200–
201) [39].
Lastly, since factual knowledge (according to figure 1) also provides an input to the
dense knowledge network or personal knowledge store of practitioners, it is not illogical
to argue that intuitive knowing could very well have an underlying scientific base, a point
that is also echoed by others [40].
Do science-based practitioners prioritize non-scientific knowledge over scientific
knowledge?
This section addresses the question whether it can be claimed that science-based practi-
tioners prioritize non-scientific knowledge over scientific knowledge in certain instances.
A four-fold taxonomy of practice knowledge by Estabrooks et al. [41] provides an intro-
duction to this discussion. Estabrooks and colleagues classified the knowledge of nurses
into four categories: social interactions, experiential knowledge, documents and a pri-
ori knowledge. Social interactions refer to the processes of communication, information
exchange and relationship formation among nurses, and also between nurses and other
health care professionals, patients and their families. These are either informal (spon-
taneous interactions) or formal (structured according to time and place, e.g. conferences,
short courses and ward rounds). Experiential knowledge is gained through practice obser-
vations. Documents can be either unit-based (patient charts, treatment protocols, etc.) or
off-unit (journals, research reports, etc.). A priori knowledge refers to intrinsic knowledge
that nurses bring with them to their unit, which includes the knowledge they acquired at
nursing school, their personal beliefs and common sense.
Estabrooks and colleagues [41] found that social interactions were the most important
source of information, followed by experiential knowledge. According to the authors,
it is not uncommon for experiential knowledge and documented knowledge to compete
directly, especially in instances where documentary evidence (in journals, protocols, etc.)
requires a change of practice where the practitioner’s experiential knowledge suggests
otherwise. This often results in the nurses not implementing the documentary evidence.
However, I would argue that such scenarios do not mean that practitioners prioritize
non-science over science in their decision-making. Experiential knowledge and a pri-
ori knowledge are illustrative of embodied, non-propositional knowledge but, as stated
elsewhere, it does not mean that parts of these cannot ultimately be formulated as verbal
rules (propositions), documented, and subjected to public scrutiny. In instances where
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such verbal rules can be extracted and their scientific backing demonstrated, the extracted
rules would qualify as facts. A potential factual base is thus always lurking in the back-
ground, which could turn out to be either rooted in valid evidence or simply a mistaken
hypothesis. However, the final verdict requires human intervention: someone has to link
the knowledge claims to existing scientific evidence or initiate new research into the va-
lidity of the claims. Similarly, what Estabrooks et al. refer to as documents are carriers
of codified propositions. Given the diversity of documents that are available in practice
settings, the propositions conveyed by these documents may or may not be factual, again
depending on the degree of supporting scientific evidence. Lastly, formal and informal
social interactions typically involve the exchange of propositions, and again it could be
established whether these are based on scientific evidence once the propositions have
been documented.
The same reasoning applies to my own work on the information sources of winemak-
ers. Elsewhere in this journal [8] I discussed the information sources that South African
winemakers most frequently consult, but the focus now is on the extent to which the same
group of winemakers regard a selection of these sources as extremely important for their
winemaking practice. As can be seen in table 1, considerable importance is attached
to experience and personal knowledge. Again, it needs to be emphasized that although
they place significantly higher value on experience, personal knowledge and informal so-
cial interactions (compared with various explicit sources of scientific research findings),
this does not necessarily mean that winemakers prioritize non-scientific knowledge over
scientific knowledge. Should the rules of knowing that underlie both experiential and
personal knowledge be made explicit and thus public (provided that the knowledge is not
tacit), a factual evidence base may or may not emerge if the rules are linked to new or
existing scientific evidence.
Moreover, it needs to be remembered that the scientific method is a tool that draws “on
independent realities to evaluate claims rather than depending on reason alone” [42, p. 7].
It is characterised by a special form of reasoning, namely empirical reasoning, which im-
plies systematic observation and measurement. Kuhn [43], for instance, argued that sci-
entific thinking is not “a technical, rarefied form of thought, accessible and relevant only
to specialists trained in its use” (p. 261). By referring to a series of exercises, Kuhn illus-
trated that argumentative reasoning (e.g. if X, then Y, and if not X, then not Y), which at
times underlies conscious and reflective thinking in everyday practice, could also be seen
to resemble the kind of good thinking found in the scientific method. Thus, not only scien-
tists can apply empirical reasoning (i.e. theorization combined with experimentation and
systematic observation) to arrive at factual claims. Hence, knowledge derived from expe-
rience may also be considered factual at times. However, in order for such knowledge to
earn the label of “scientific” it needs to be properly documented for it to be validated (e.g.
through replication studies or peer review), as science is essentially a public endeavour.
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Table 1. Extent to which South African Winemakers regarded Information Sources as Extremely Important
for their Winemaking.
Percentage
Classification of information source
Information source extremely
in terms of:
important
Knowledge claims
that it contains
Source category
(Estabrooks et al. [41])
Own experience (what has worked/
not worked before) (N=211)
76% Factual/ potential
factual/ belief
Experiential
Results of wine analyses from wine
laboratories (N=211)
76% Factual Documents
Personal knowledge/ intuition/ com-
mon sense (N=210)
74% Factual/ potential
factual/ belief
A priori*
Staff or colleagues at your cellar/
winery/ estate (N=207)
58% Factual/ potential
factual/ belief
Social interactions:
informal
South African winemakers in other
cellars/ wineries/ estates (N=209)
57% Factual/ potential
factual/ belief
Social interactions:
informal
Formal training received at college/
university (N=210)
50% Factual Social interactions:
formal
Textbooks and manuals of winemak-
ing (N=209)
45% Factual Documents
Information sessions/ seminars/
workshops for the South African
wine industry (N=208)
33% Factual Social interactions:
formal
# Wynboer in the WineLand magazine
(N=211)
15% Factual Documents
# South African Journal of Enology
and Viticulture (N=209)
9% Factual Documents
# See Boshoff [8, p. 8] for a description of these two information sources; the survey methodology —
which generated the above results — is also described in that paper.
* I am using the notion of a priori knowledge here to be consistent with the taxonomy by Estabrooks et
al. [41]. However, based on the portrayal of a practitioner’s knowledge store in figure 1, it is more correct
to say that “personal knowledge/ intuition/ common sense” is informed by not only a priori knowledge but
also by knowledge from all the other source categories (experience, social interactions and documents).
Concluding comments
Future studies on the social dynamics of knowledge could benefit from the theoretical
frame provided in this paper, especially studies on the knowledge of professionals who
fall into the first category of science-based practitioners, as explained in the introduction
(i.e. those whose practices are informed by the outputs of science). Relevant questions
for empirical investigation include the following: under what conditions are the personal
knowledge and experiences of science-based practitioners (and others) prioritized over
scientific knowledge, and to what extent and how can their personal and experiential
knowledge be documented and its factuality demonstrated? These are topics for mostly
qualitative (but also quantitative) enquiry that could be of interest to scholars in science
communication and knowledge utilisation, given that science communication — as an
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interdisciplinary field of study — is also concerned with “whose truth most matters in so-
ciety” [11, p. 2]. It also calls for critical engagement with social constructivist theories of
learning [44]. In fact, the social constructivist take on learning theory is precisely what has
been highlighted here, namely that external information (e.g. a particular research find-
ing) is assessed in the light of existing personal knowledge and experiences, and on the
basis of that interaction new knowledge gets constructed. Moreover, studies on the social
dynamics of knowledge in different practice contexts, and specifically how these affect
science communication efforts and research uptake, also have the potential of broadening
the types of research methods that are currently favoured in science communication re-
search. By proposing more ethnographic case studies on the “knowledge” component of
knowledge utilisation, and even theory-building studies, a reply could be formulated in re-
sponse to Borchelt’s question [45] as to whether there is life beyond the current emphasis
on content analysis and attitude surveys as research methods in science communication.
The notion of a knowledge store, and the various associated concepts of knowledge,
could also add to the wider discussion on scientific expertise. The integration of factual
and procedural knowledge, as well as instances of common sense and intuitive knowing
that are informed by a rich network of knowledge and experience, are all “hallmarks” of
experts. Both categories of science-based practitioners (e.g. both the university professor
in oenology who produces science and the winemaker at the family estate whose practice
is informed by the outputs of science) can be regarded as what Collins and Evans [46]
described as “contributory experts”, as each would have sufficient expertise to contribute
to the science of the topic in question (winemaking). According to these authors:
it is more difficult to separate the credentialed scientist from the experienced prac-
titioner than was once thought: when we move toward experience as a criterion of
expertise the boundary around science softens, and the set of activities known as
‘science’ merges into expertise in general [46, p. 253].
However, having contributory expertise does not necessarily imply the presence of in-
teractional expertise as well. The latter entails having enough expertise to interact with
and absorb the contributory expertise of the other [46]. My take on the matter is that
science communicators — as professional specialists — are intermediaries trying to com-
pensate for the lack of interactional expertise of scientists through “the use of appropriate
skills, media, activities, and dialogue” to produce the outcomes of “awareness, enjoy-
ment, interest, opinion-forming, and understanding” [47, p. 183]. However, what inter-
mediaries currently compensate for the lack of interactional expertise of the contributing
experts in the practice domain in order for these experts’ claims to be valued by scien-
tists? The question is relevant in the light of a previous comment that not only scientists
but also practitioners in everyday settings can apply the principles of the scientific method
to arrive at factual claims. Moreover, what kind of scientific knowledge should science
communicators be concerned with as part of their professional activities? Should this
be only knowledge generated by the scientific method at scientific institutions by those
with the necessary credentials? Or should the activities of science communicators expand
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to include knowledge that is generated through the application of the scientific method
in experienced-based practice? Or what about potential factual and procedural knowl-
edge that is embodied in a practitioner’s “knowledge store”, which needs to be extracted,
documented and communicated to scientists so that the knowledge claims become public
and can be tested and verified? Should that also be part of science communication as a
professional specialisation? The many questions beg for debate and response.
References
[1] A. Cherney, B. Head, P. Boreham, J. Povey and M. Ferguson (2013), “Research utilization in the
social sciences: a comparison of five academic disciplines in Australia”, Sci. Commun. 35: 780–809.
[2] B.I. Crona and J.N. Parker (2011), “Network determinants of knowledge utilization: preliminary
lessons from a boundary organization”, Sci. Commun. 33: 448–471.
[3] N. Jacobson (2007), “Social epistemology — theory for the ‘fourth wave’ of knowledge transfer and
exchange research”, Sci. Commun. 29: 116–127.
[4] O. Belkhodja, N. Amara, R. Landry and M. Ouimet (2007), “The extent and organizational
determinants of research utilization in Canadian health services organizations”, Sci. Commun. 28:
377–417.
[5] N. Amara, M. Ouimet and R. Landry (2004), “New evidence on instrumental, conceptual, and
symbolic utilization of university research in government agencies”, Sci. Commun. 26: 75–106.
[6] D.M. Kramer and D.C. Cole (2003), “Sustained, intensive engagement to promote health and safety
knowledge transfer to and utilization by workplaces”, Sci. Commun. 25: 56–82.
[7] R. Landry, N. Amara and M. Lamari (2001), “Climbing the ladder of research utilization: evidence
from social science research”, Sci. Commun. 22: 396–422.
[8] N. Boshoff (2014), “Use of scientific research by South African winemakers”, JCOM 13(01): A01,
retrieved 18 June 2014.
[9] S. Tveden-Nyborg, M. Misfeldt and B. Boelt (2012), “Scientific knowledge dissemination in Danish
seed communities of practice”, JCOM 11(03): A02, retrieved 18 June 2014.
[10] M.J. Carneiro and T. da-Silva-Rosa (2011), “The use of scientific knowledge in the decision making
process of environmental public policies in Brazil”, JCOM 10(01): A03, retrieved 18 June 2014.
[11] S.H. Priest (2010), “Coming of age in the academy? The status of our emerging field”, JCOM
09(03): C06, retrieved 18 June 2014.
[12] I.D. Graham, J. Logan, M.B. Harrison, S.E. Straus, J. Tetroe, W. Caswell and N. Robinson (2006),
“Lost in knowledge translation: time for a map?”, J. Contin. Educ. Health. Prof. 26: 13–24.
[13] G. Ryle (1949), The concept of mind, Hutchinson, London, U.K. .
[14] G. Ryle (1971), “Knowing how and knowing that”, in Collected papers: Volume II of collected
essays, 1929–1968, Hutchinson & Co, London, U.K. .
[15] B. Sahdra and P. Thagard (2003), “Procedural knowledge in molecular biology”, Philos. Psychol.
16: 477–498.
[16] D. Pears (1971), What is knowledge?, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, U.K. .
[17] J. Rycroft-Malone, K. Seers, A. Titchen, G. Harvey, A. Kitson and B. McCormack (2004), “What
counts as evidence in evidence-based practice?”, J. Adv. Nurs. 47: 81–90.
[18] D. O’Brien (2006), An introduction to the theory of knowledge, Polity Press, Cambridge, U.K. .
[19] S. Haack (1993), Evidence and inquiry: towards reconstruction in epistemology, Blackwell
Publishers, Malden, U.S.A.
Types of knowledge in science-based practices 15
[20] CHSRF (2005), Conceptualizing and combining evidence for health system guidance, Canadian
Health Services Research Foundation, Ottawa, Canada.
[21] P. Thagard (2006), “How to collaborate: procedural knowledge in the cooperative development of
science”, Southern J. Philos. XLN: 177–196.
[22] H. Taylor (2005), “A critical decision interview approach to capturing tacit knowledge: principles
and application”, Int. J. Knowl. Manage. 1: 25–39.
[23] M. Polanyi (1966), The tacit dimension, Doubleday, New York, U.S.A. .
[24] P. Nilsen, K. Roback, A. Brostro¨m and P.-E. Ellstro¨m (2012), “Creatures of habit: accounting for
the role of habit in implementation research on clinical behaviour change”, Implement. Sci. 7: 53.
[25] B.A. Carper (1978), “Fundamental patterns of knowing in nursing”, Adv. Nurs. Sci. 1: 13–23.
[26] B. McCormack (1992), “Intuition: concept analysis and application to curriculum development. I.
Concept analysis”, J. Clin. Nurs. 1: 339–344.
[27] E. Stolper, M. van Bokhoven, P. Houben, P. van Royen, M. van de Wiel, T. van der Weijden and G.J.
Dinant (2009), “The diagnostic role of gut feelings in general practice: a focus group study of the
concept and its determinants”, BMC Fam. Pract. 10: 17.
[28] C. Geertz (1983), Local knowledge: further essays in interpretive anthropology, Basic Books, New
York, U.S.A. .
[29] G. Norman, M. Young and L. Brooks (2007), “Non-analytical models of clinical reasoning: the role
of experience”, Med. Educ. 41: 1140–1145.
[30] L. Chaffy, C. Unsworth and E. Fossey (2010), “A grounded theory of intuition among occupational
therapists in mental health practice”, Brit. J. Occup. Ther. 73: 300–308.
[31] H.L. Dreyfus and S.E. Dreyfus (1986), Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and
expertise in the era of the computer, The Free Press, New York, U.S.A. .
[32] P. Benner (1984), From novice to expert: excellence and power in clinical nursing practice,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Menlo Park, U.S.A.
[33] W. Jones (2011), “No knowledge but through information”, in D.J. Pauleen and G.E. Gorman eds.,
Personal knowledge management, Gower Publishing, Farnham, U.K. .
[34] V. Ambrosini and C. Bowman (2001), “Tacit knowledge: some suggestions for operationalization”,
J. Manage. Stud. 38: 811–829.
[35] S. Timmermans and E.S. Kolker (2004), “Evidence-based medicine and the reconfiguration of
medical knowledge”, J. Health. Soc. Behav. 45: 177–193.
[36] K. Bannigan and R. Bryar (2002), “The importance of overcoming barriers to research utilization”,
Brit. J. Ther. Rehabil. 9: 270–273.
[37] T. Greenhalgh (2002), “Intuition and evidence — uneasy bedfellows?”, Brit. J. Gen. Prac. 52:
395–400.
[38] J. Gabbay and A. le May (2004), “Evidence based guidelines or collectively constructed
‘mindlines’? Ethnographic study of knowledge management in primary care”, Brit. Med. J. 329:
1013–1016.
[39] E. Stolper, M. van de Wiel, P. van Royen, M. van Bokhoven, T. van der Weijden and G.J. Dinant
(2010), “Gut feelings as a third track in general practitioners’ diagnostic reasoning”, J. Gen. Intern.
Med. 96: 197–203.
[40] I. Welsh and C.M. Lyons (2001), “Evidence-based care and the case for intuition and tacit
knowledge in clinical assessment and decision making in mental health nursing practice: an
empirical contribution to the debate”, J Psychiatr. Ment. Hlt. 8: 299–305.
[41] C.A. Estabrooks, W. Rutakumwa, K.A. O’Leary, J. Profetto-McGrath, M. Milner, M.J. Levers and
S. Scott-Findlay (2005), “Sources of practice knowledge among nurses”, Qual. Health Res. 15(4):
460–476.
16 N. Boshoff
[42] R.L. Rosnow and R. Rosenthal (1996), Beginning behavioural research: a conceptual primer, 2nd
ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, U.S.A.
[43] D. Kuhn (1996), “Is good thinking scientific thinking?”, in D.R. Olson and N. Torrance eds., Modes
of thought: explorations in culture and cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. .
[44] A. Thomas, A. Menon, J. Boruff, A. Rodriguez and S. Ahmed (2014), “Applications of social
constructivist learning theories in knowledge translation for healthcare professionals: a scoping
review”, Implement. Sci. 9:54.
[45] R. Borchelt (2012), “The science communication literature research project. Looking back at a
decade of PCST research, 2000–2009”, paper presented at the 12th International Public
Communication of Science and Technology Conference, Florence, Italy, 18–20 April 2012.
[46] H.M. Collins and R. Evans (2002), “The third wave of science studies: studies of expertise and
experience”, Soc. Stud. Sci. 32(2): 235–296.
[47] T.W. Burns, D.J. O’Connor and S.M. Stocklmayer (2003), “Science communication: a
contemporary definition”, Pub. Underst. Sci. 12: 183–202.
Author
Nelius Boshoff (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Sci-
ence and Technology (CREST) at Stellenbosch University, South Africa, host of the DST-
NRF Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and STI Policy. His professional interests
include studies of knowledge uptake, research impact and research collaboration, as well
as bibliometrics with a focus on Africa. E-mail: scb@sun.ac.za.
HOW TO CITE: N. Boshoff, “Types of knowledge in science-based practices”,
JCOM 13(03)(2014)A06.
